Adopted Resolutions
On April 6, 1974, the Conference of Plenipotentiaries also adopted two resolutions and the Final Act of the Conference 2.
The Conference, in one of the resolutions, resolved that nothing in the Convention "shall be construed so as to deny shippers an option in the choice between conference shipping lines and non-conference shipping lines, subject to any loyalty arrangements, where they exist" and that, in the interest of the sound development of liner shipping service, non-conference lines should not be prevented from operating so long as they adhere to the principle of fair competition on a commercial basis.
In the other resolution, the Conference, noting that proposals had been made to submit certain types of disputes to local conciliation, requested the first Review Conference to give priority consideration to the matter of local conciliation, taking into account the views expressed by the Contracting Parties to the Convention on whether or not the absence of local conciliation has hampered the effective settlement of disputes and, if so, to consider the appropriate subjects and procedures for local conciliation.
Concluding Remarks
There can be no doubt that the Convention is a revolutionary piece of international shipping legislation, of great significance for liner conference shipping. To the extent that it is the first in,ternationally-negotiated and internationally-agreed legal instrument for regulating the activities of what is after all a form of multinational cartel, its significance may be said to go beyond the liner conference industry. By contributing to the progressive development of international law, it will also contribute to the building of a new international economic order, on which the UN General Assembly, recently at its sixth special session devoted to the problems of raw materials and development, has adopted a Declaration and a Programme of Action.
The Programme of Action in fact called for all efforts to be made to ensure the early implementation of the Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences 3
It remains for Governments to become contracting parties to the Convention and to take such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to implement the Code. Article 48 of the Convention provides that all states are entitled to become contracting parties to the Convention by signature subject to and followed by ratification, acceptance or approval; by signature without reservation as to ratification, acceptance or approval; or by accession. Private shipping has been and is beset by a host of "other" problems, e.g. containerization, lack of capital to push the construction of profitable specialized ships such as liquid gas tankers or oil/bulk/ore carriers, etc 2. All of these "other" problems are, however, relatively easy to cope with because they are economic in nature. Real serious difficulties for private shipping only arise once the decisive variables are outside their direct sphere of influence, i. e. once the variables are political. Flag discrimination, the topic of this article, undoubtedly 
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is the most pressing political problem for private shipping; a problem which has highly unpleasant economic consequences for private shipping companies in particular and efficient low-cost sea transport in general.
Threatened Freedom of Choice
The term "flag discrimination" refers to the practice of an ever growing number of countries to reserve a certain share of their foreign trade for transportation by ships that fly their respective national flags. Unfortunately not only less developed nations indulge in this practice -arguing that their fledgling national fleets would soon be overwhelmed by the established shipping companies unless protected from free competition -but developed countries such as the USA as well threaten the freedom of international shippers to select the vessel of their choice, whichever it may be 3
The so-called Cargo Preference Act, which became law in the USA in 1954, is a good example here. This Act adds a new dimension to the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 in that it reserves for American ships at least half of all freight generated in one way or another by US government agencies. If furthermore freight has been financed by an American government agency or by the ExportImport Bank, then all of it is reserved for US ships 4. The Japanese -to name another developed nation that joins the ranks of the flag discriminators -are imitating the USA and strive for a share of at least 50 p.c. of their foreign trade to be transported by Japanese ships. This is a very serious development for the private shipping companies, particularly as Japan has up till now been a major customer of free international shipping 5
The bad example set by some developed nations, such as the USA, has induced more and more less developed ones to overcome their last political inhibitions and go all out for flag discrimination 6. To make matters worse, an ever growing number of these "new" shipping nations begins to consider a 50 p.c. share as too moderate. Brazil for example insists that a much higher percentage of its most important cash crops, such as coffee and cotton, should be reserved for Brazilian ships 7. Another Latin American country, Argentine, is currently entangled in a dispute with Brussels because of its petty and excessive flag discrimination practices 8.
Most of the other South American countries -as well as members of the Latin American Free Trade Association LAFTA --argue for a further tightening of flag discrimination while simultaneously agreeing on exempting one another from this practice. The aim quite clearly is to exclude the established maritime nations of Europe as far as possible from the Latin American sea freight market 9. A decisive factor-which makes it unlikely that the flag discriminators will reconsider in the immediate future -must be mentioned in this context, viz. the over-capacity in world shipping. With the exception of specialized ships such as liquid gas tankers, world sea transport has suffered for years from an imbalance of freight volume and shipping capacity. Too many ships wait for freight and thereby depress freight rates. The extent of this over-capacity is significant indeed, viz. 1973/74 roughly 17-21 mn tons lo.
